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INTEREST RATE POLICIES 
AND BORROWING COSTS IN RURAL FINANCIAL MARKETS: 
A CASE STUDY 
Abstract 
Hidden costs are an important feature of credit transactions 
in rural financial markets of lesser developed countries. There 
is frequently a trade-off between explicit interest charges and 
implicit borrowing costs such that smaller borrowers experience 
relatively greater borrowing costs than larger borrowers in a 
low, subsidized interest setting. 
INTEREST RATE POLICIES 
AND BORROWING COSTS IN RURAL FINANCIAL MARKETS: 
A CASE STUDY 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the nature and 
dimension of borrowing costs imposed by lenders on agricultural 
borrowers in an environment of controlled and fragmented interest 
rates for loans; targeting or end-use requirements imposed by 
governmental authorities or international donors, and specialized 
lending institutions dealing with agricultural credit. 
Credit allocation by lenders can be done in terms of price 
setting or loan rate differentiation determined by the riskiness 
of the loan (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Sealey, 1980). Typically 
there are constraints on price setting and loan rate differentiation 
in the institutional milieu of rural financial markets in lesser 
developed countries (LDCs). These markets are frequently the 
scene of policy actions targeting credit flows to specified groups 
at concessionary interest rates (Adams and Graham, 1981). 
In this setting lenders, in facing constraints on price 
setting or loan rate differentiation, are induced into regulatory 
avoidance or Jmplidt price setting (K,me, 1981). This involves 
different procedures for credit allocation, monitoring and 
-1-
supervision that create both lender and borrower transactions 
costs (Adams and Graham, 1981; Ladman, 1981). This in effect 
amounts to exercising price setting through the non-interest 
component of the price vector. Thus lenders engage in a discri-
minatory application of loan procedures runong borrowers. This 
enables them to ration out unwanted clients and keep (or ration 
in) desired clients. The lender can transfer the burden of 
transaction costs from himself to the borrower in the form of 
administrative charges, fees, documentation requirements and 
charges, compensatory balances, etc. 
In the study that follows we shall be investigating field 
survey results that show how agricultural lenders in Honduras 
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have in practice adjusted their credit procedures to allocate 
credit in the context of various end-use requirements and a 
limited range of interest rates within which they were able to 
operate. We shall see to what extent they in fact transferred 
borrowing costs to borrowers according to selected features of the 
loan operating as proxies for risk. 
The Model and Empirical Results 
A general formulation of the model used in this study is as 
follows: T = T(B,i) (1) 
where: T is the borrowing transaction costs 
B is a vector of risk-related characteristics of the loan 
operation (loan size, farm size, end-use, etc.) 
i is the explicit interest rate that can be charged on loans. 
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Transaction costs are defined here as all those non-interest 
explicit and implicit expenses incurred by the borrower in the 
process of obtaining a loan. These costs occur at different 
stages of the sequence of procedures established by the lending 
institutions, in general: application and documentation, 
approval, and disbursement. Explicit expenses refer basically to 
the following: 
(a) Cost of transportation, lodging and meals when 
travelling to the office of the institution granting 
the loan, or to other places with the purpose of 
obtaining related documents. 
{b) Fees, taxes or other charges associated with the 
issuing of documents, registration of guarantees or 
collateral, contracts and the like. 
(c) Explicit charges imposed by the lending institutions 
in the process of handling the application. 
The implicit transaction costs directly related to the 
borrowing considered here correspond to the value of the time 
foregone by farmers attributable to negotiating and securing 
their loan. 
We argue that lenders are price-setters (of explicit and im-
plicit interest charges) that take as given the profile of charac-
teristics of total loan demand such as farm size, loan amounts 
demanded, enterprise type, characteristics of the borrowers, etc. 
They then set explicit interest charges and, more importantly 
here, establish differential administrative procedures that are in 
effect transformed into implicit charges (i.e. transaction costs for 
the borrower) according to these loan demand characteristics. 
Components of B in the general formulation above refer to 
those proxies associated with risk. The key elements here from 
the point of view of the lender are farm size (associated with 
farm wealth and the capacity for loan recovery); the loan amount 
(the larger the amount the greater the risk); and loan use 
(enterprise type characteristics associated with different levels 
of farming risks, marketing risks, built in collateral, etc.) 
Data utilized in our field study came from a random 
sample of farm level clients of selected lenders in Honduras. 
The survey was undertaken in August 1981 and consisted of a 
total of 198 farmer-clients of which 104 had loans from the 
National Agricultural Development Bank (BANADESA), 52 had loans 
from private commercial banks and 42 had received credit from 
small rural credit unions. Approximately one half of the total 
sample of farm borrowers had loans less than 5,000 lempiras 
(i.e. $2,500 at the current exchange rate of two lempiras equal 
to one dollar). The average loan size however was close to 23,000 
lempiras indicating a clear asynm1etry or skewness in the overall 
distribution of loans. 
Although the distribution of the clientele for each loan 
source overlaps to some extent, each can be clearly identif ietl 
with respect to the predominant scope of their operations in 
terms of loan and farm size. Rural credit unions in Honduras 
are the classic small farmer loan source with most loans below 
2,000 lempiras in size on farms typically less than 20 hectares. 
At the other extreme are the farmer-clients of the private 
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commercial banks with the larger proportion of their loans over 
25,000 lempiras on farms generally above 100 hectares. The 
national agricultural development bank (BANADESA) activity falls 
in between with a majority of its loan operations between 1,000 
and 10,000 lempiras on farms largely between 10 and 100 hectares. 
The aggregate results for the sample as a whole indicates 
that the various elements of borrowing or transactions costs 
added roughly three percentage points to the average explicit 
interest rate of 13 percent. This represents almost one quarter 
of the interest rate. More importantly ho~er is the incidence 
of these borrowing costs by loan and farm size in the sample. 
Table 1, panels A and B, highlight the results of transactions 
or borrowing costs per loan and per lempira. Transactions costs 
per loan are positively related to both loan and farm size, however, 
when one takes into account the size of the loan it can be seen 
that transactions costs per lempira are negatively related to 
both loan and farm size. In short the smaller the farm and the 
smaller the loan, the greater the relative importance of 
transactions costs per lempira. 
Multiple Regression Model and Results 
A more rigorous formal estimation of the determinants 
of total transaction costs was undertaken using a power 
function specification for the variables in the model. 
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Table 1. Borrowing Costs per Loan and per Lempira by 
Fann Size and Loan Size. 
Panel A. Borrowin15 Costs 1 b:Y: Farm Size-!.1 
Transaction 
Costs Interest Total Borrowing Costs 
Fann Size Per Loan Rate Per LemEira (%) ____ 
Category (Has.) (LJ2S.) (%) AEJ2roved Disbursed 
Less than 5 31.75 13 16.0 17.33 
5.1 - 10 40.0 13 15.07 17.14 
10.1 - 20 53.5 13 16.20 17.67 
20.1 - 50 56.25 13 14.64 15.52 
50.1 - 100 75.0 13 14.84 15.64 
100.1 - 200 133.75 13.5 16.52 17.52 
More than 200 149.25 13 13.82 14.02 
Panel B. Borrowing Costs, by Loan Size-1:1 
Transaction 
Costs Interest Total Borrowing Costs 
Loan Size Per Loan Rate Per LemEira (%) 
Category (LEs•) (LES.) (%) ApEroved Disbursed 
Less than 1,000 30.75 13 18.92 19.23 
1,001 - 2,000 42.0 13 16.07 17.73 
2,001 - 5,000 44.88 13 14.88 15.77 
5,001 - 10,000 53.0 13 14.01 14.94 
10,001 - 15,000 86.75 13 14.56 14.87 
15,001 - 25,000 42.75 13.5 13.89 14.35 
25,001 - 50,000 131.50 14 14.40 15. 71 
50,001 - 100,000 322.50 13 13.17 13.63 
More than 100,000 1,414.50 11 12.09 12.36 
------ -- - --
1/All values are median values. Therefore, the median values of 
total borrowing costs are not necessarily the sum of the median 
values of the separate transaction costs per lempira plu~ tht> 
median value of the interest rate, as they would be if mean 
values had been used. 
Source: Survey results. 
This specification was chosen in order to directly estimate 
the elasticities of transactions costs with respect to the 
proxies for loan risk and the explicit interest rate. At the 
same time the per lempira specification allows us to correct 
for any potential problem of heteroskedasticity. 
The form of this specification is as follows: 
T- aAf\.Y (i) 0e 2 
and t = aA~(y-l)(i) 0e2 
"~>rhere t T (i.e. transactions cost per lempira). =-L 
and T = transactions cost per loan in lempiras. 
A = farm size in hectares 
L ~ approved loan amount in l~1piras 
i = the explicit interest rate 
e = the base of the natural log 
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(2) 
(3) 
with n1 and n2 dummy variables representing deviations of T in private 
banks and credit unions with respect to BANADESA, the base or level 
of reference; and ul. u2 and u3 being dummy variables defined to han-
dle the deviations due to enterprise type or end-use of the loan in 
basic grains u1 , export crops u2, and livestock u3 , with respect to 
the miscellaneous end-use category of all other end-uses in agri-
culture (land purchases, trade, vegetable crops, etc.). 
The results of the ordinary least squares estimation 
for the log linear transformation of equation (2) are presented 
in columns 1, 2 and 3 in Table 2. Those corresponding to 
equation (3) are presented in columns 4, 5, and 6 of the same 
table. The signs, the magnitude and significance level of all 
coefficients are as expected in our previous discussion. 
Table 2. Regression Analysis of Transaction Costs Per Loan and Transaction Costs 
Per Lempira. Estimated Coefficients in Different Regressions.l/ 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Area of the Farm 
Loan Amount 
Interest Rate~/ 
Loan Source: 
Private Banks 
Credit Unions 
Loan Use: 
Basic Grains 
Export Crops 
Livestock 
Intercept 
R-Square 
Transaction Costs Per Loan Equations 
1 2 3 
0.0758 
(1.01) 
0.2621 
(3.14)a 
- 1.0781 
(-4.47)a 
0.54 
(2.20)b 
- 1.02 
(-4.47)a 
4.47 
(5. 01) a 
0.43 
0.0001 
(0.0) 
0.3387 
(3. 84 )a 
- 0.9237 
(-3.78)a 
0.59 
(2.20)b 
- 0.83 
(-3.ll)a 
0.36 
(1. 36) 
- 0.34 
(-1.09) 
0.49 
(1. SO) 
3.42 
(3.40) 8 
0.47 
0.3658 
(5 .30)8 
- 0.8662 
(-3.63)a 
0.50 
(1. 93) b 
- 0.83 
(-3.23)a 
0.34 
(1. 36) 
- 0.38 
(-1.28) 
0.45 
(1. 48) 
3.09 
(3.32) 8 
0.46 
Transaction Costs per Lempira Equations 
4 5 6 
0.0758 
(1.01) 
- 0. 7378 
(-8.84)8 
- 1.0781 
(-4.47)a 
0.54 
(2.20)b 
- 1.02 
(-4.47) 8 
9.07 
(10.17)a 
0.46 
0.0001 
(0.0) 
- 0.6612 
(-7.So)a 
- 0.9237 
(-3.78)a 
0.59 
(2.20)b 
- 0.83 
(-3.ll)a 
0.36 
(1. 36) 
- 0.34 
(-1.09) 
0.49 
(1. 50) 
8.03 
(7.97)a 
0.49 
- 0.6342 
(-9.19)a 
- 0.8662 
(-3.63)a 
0.50 
(1.93)b 
- 0.83 
(-3.23)a 
0.34 
(1.36) 
- 0.38 
(-1.28) 
0.45 
(1. 48) 
7.69 
(8.27)a 
0.48 
a a a a a a F Value 26.66 18.81 22.20 29.69 20.80 23.46 
lit-statistics in parentheses. Significance levels: a, 0.01; b, 0.05. ~ 
~It-statistics for the hypothesis 6=-1 were computed with the following results: eq. 4: -0.3237; 
eq. 5: 0.3124; eq. 6: 0.5609. Therefore the hypothesis is not rejected in any of these cases. 
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Among the more relevant findings is the fact that farm 
h L::e is not significant. Dropping this variable fran the 
t•quation does not change the overall significance and in the end 
1:-;implifies the specification. Another tinding here is that trans-
action costs per loan are an increasing function of loan size. This 
can be seen in Figure 1 where our findings are portrayed for refer-
ence. This finding contradicts the assumption made in some studies 
(e.g. Ladman, 1981) that transaction costs are independent of loan 
size. The behavior of these costs with respect to loan size high-
lights the cost economies evident in making larger sized loans. The 
elasticity of transaction or borrowing costs with respect to loan 
size is less than one (it ranges from 0.26 to 0.37 in Table 2) while 
the level of the explicit interest rate is a shift parameter in this 
relationship as can be seen in Figure 1. 
In the light of these findings we can also see that trans-
action costs per lempira is a monotonically Jel'l"l'asing function of 
loan size with the explicit interest rat~ as .1 shift parameter as 
seen in Figure 2. In other words, for a given loan size an increase 
in the interest rate that lenders charge would lead to a reduction 
of transactions costs per lempira. 
The most interesting finding emerging from this sample data 
is that the elasticity of t, transaction costs per lempira, with 
respect to the explicit nominal interest rate is not statistically 
different from minus one; the range of values obtained is -0.8662 
through -1.0761 and the tests performed on these estimates indi-
cate we cannot reject the hypothesis that the elasticity is minus 
one. This means that t and i are perfect substitutes for each 
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other. A one percent increase in the explicit interest rate leads 
to a one percent decline in transaction costs per lempira. 
An additional finding here :l.s that this elasticity of t to 
changes in i has a differential impact on the borrowing costs of 
different loan sizes. Figure 3 illustrates this point where loan 
size is the shift parameter in this diagram. The curve shifts down-
ward (towards the origin) when loan size increases and upward 
(away from the origin)when the loan size decreases. At a given 
explicit interest rate i , a change in i will create a larger 
0 
absolute change in the opposite direction in average transaction 
cost per lempira for smaller loans than for larger loans (see Figure 3). 
This result implies that a rise in the explicit interest rate 
will create a relatively more progressive or equitable result in 
that this increase will reduce the absolute borrowing or trans-
actions costs per lempira for smaller sized loans relatively more 
than for larger sized loans. An illustration of the change in 
overall borrowing costs (t+i) brought about by a change in the 
explicit interest rate (i) can be seen below: 
Loan Size (in lempiras) 
1,000 
5,300 (median value in 
the sample) 
100,000 
d(t+i)/di 
0.80 
.93 
• 99 
Thus a one point increase in the interest rate will create 0.8 of a 
point increase in total borrowing costs for a loan size of 1,000 
lempiras and 0.99 of a point increase for 100,000 lempiras. The 
offsetting decline in non-interest borrowing or transactions cost 
is stronger for smaller sized loans. 
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The issue of non-intere::.t borrowing costs is an important fea-
ture of rural financial markets. This study illustrates how impli-
cit borrowing costs in Honduras are significantly associated with loan 
size and borrowing costs per lempira a substitute for interest charges. 
It was found there was a differential incidence of borrowing costs by 
loan size such that a rise in the interest rate would have a greater 
relative effect in increasing total borrowing costs for larger than 
smaller loans and, conversely, a decline in interest rates would 
lower total borrowing costs relatively more for larger than smaller 
loan sizes. Subsidized credit programs therefore may have an 
inequitable etfect on borrower!:> by loan ..,ize. 
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